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ABSTRACT
The digitization of taxation systems can assist inclusion. However, it can also
inadvertently lead to adverse outcomes for the poor in developing countries
where many firms in the informal sector have low capabilities. Moreover,
larger formal sector firms are often politically networked and in a position
to engage in extractive informal transactions that digitization alone cannot
restrict. Thus, while digitization creates tools for the enforcement of for-
mal regulations, formalization can be unequal. This contribution focuses on
digitized taxation as an application of a more general problem with digi-
tization as a tool for formalization, referring to evidence from the rollout
of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India. Using the analysis of pol-
itical settlements, the authors distinguish between types of rule violations
in developing economies. Networked higher-capability firms engage in ‘in-
formal’ transactions when they violate rules to extract rents. This is different
from the informality of unregistered micro and small enterprises in the infor-
mal sector who often violate rules they cannot adhere to, and make informal
payments to enforcers to continue operating. When digital technologies are
used in these contexts, adverse outcomes for welfare and inclusion can fol-
low from ‘premature formalization’. A more cautious and inclusive path to
formalization is necessary to protect vulnerable groups.
INTRODUCTION
At the time of the signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985, the management
of Japanese auto company Toyota popularized the phrase ‘squeezing water
from a dry towel’. This referred to their need to extract more value from
their companies after Western countries forced the Japanese to appreciate
The authors would like to thank Srikanth Lakshmanan, Coordinator, CashlessConsumer Collec-
tive for his valuable insights on the GST in India, as well as Kate Meagher and several anony-
mous referees for many useful comments on an earlier draft.
Development and Change 0(0): 1–23. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12662
© 2021 The Authors. Development and Change published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf
of International Institute of Social Studies.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
2 Pallavi Roy and Mushtaq H. Khan
the yen to make the US dollar more competitive. It subsequently came to
mean innovating for productivity growth. A similar discourse has emerged
in contemporary developing countries using digital technologies to accel-
erate formalization in order to achieve higher productivity and greater so-
cial and economic inclusion (Aker, 2011; Heeks, 2019; ITU, 2016; Singh,
2019). An important component of this strategy is to make the tax net fully
inclusive, for instance by making value-added taxes digitally managed to in-
crease compliance. The assumption is that while this will increase the costs
of firms, they will benefit from better service delivery and be able to exer-
cise political voice (World Bank, 2007). Most importantly, by levelling the
playing field, it will force low-productivity firms to squeeze their towels and
raise productivity and force firms that are cheating to start paying taxes. The
outcome should be increased revenue generation, more inclusive represen-
tation, fairer competition, higher average productivity, more innovation and
ultimately more rapid national progress.
We argue that the challenge of productivity growth and inclusion is more
complex in developing countries, given the lower capabilities of firms and
weaker governance structures that allow different types of rule violations.
When the Japanese were squeezing their dry towel to extract more value,
they were already one of the most productive economies in the world. Inno-
vation was dispersed across a wide range of high-capability firms. In con-
trast, most developing country firms have low productivity and limited cap-
abilities for innovations that lead to productivity growth. For most such
firms, the returns from ‘squeezing’ are likely to be negligible, while the
risk that it will lead to cutting consumption or exiting from that activity are
greater. If lower-capability firms close down, sufficient employment may not
be triggered by demand shifting to larger firms to re-absorb the individuals
who have lost lower-productivity jobs. A more cautious and inclusive path
to formalization is therefore appropriate, given the vulnerability of many
low-capability ‘informal’ firms in developing countries.
Institutional economists have provided different explanations for the per-
sistence of informality. Some have focused on culture, social norms and
beliefs (Bicchieri, 2005; Fukuyama, 1996; North, 1990, 1993), others on
the resistance of powerful groups to the enforcement of rules that hurt their
interests (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2012). The political settlements
framework draws on these insights and focuses on the interdependence of
power and capabilities for explaining different types of informality and their
implications (Khan, 2010; Khan and Roy, 2019). In particular, organizations
with different power and capabilities may violate formal rules for different
reasons, with different implications for development.
A political settlement describes the distribution of power and capabil-
ities across organizations. When organizations interact with others their be-
haviour may be consistent with formal laws and regulations, or they may be
outside of, or even contravene, formal laws. In the latter case, the behaviour
of organizations can be described in terms of following informal rules or
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institutions. Formal rules are potentially subject to third party enforcement
by legally recognized agencies operating within the law. Informal rules de-
scribe patterns of behaviour that are adhered to or enforced by other means.
These can range from behaviour supported by trust, cultural norms or social
sanctions, to enforcement by informal mechanisms including mafias. Infor-
mal institutions therefore describe a wide variety of rules and it is impor-
tant to be specific about types of informality relevant for different questions
(Chen, 2006).
Organizations are more likely to adhere to formal rules if the rules are
broadly aligned with their interests. They are likely to devise informal rules
or violate formal ones when the formal rules are missing, are not feasible, or
if they have an opportunity to free ride or benefit from violations. The distri-
bution of benefits across organizations is likely to reflect the distribution of
power across them. More powerful organizations will work to change formal
and informal rules to bring the distribution of benefits into closer alignment
with the distribution of power (Khan, 2010). The political settlements frame-
work examines these interdependencies between organizational power and
capabilities, institutions, the distribution of benefits and the impact on de-
velopment. One implication is that when weaker organizations violate rules,
their benefits are generally likely to be smaller, proportionate to their relative
power. Another implication is that the same formal rules or institutions, such
as industrial policy, may result in very different outcomes across countries.
Since the relative power and capabilities of business and government are
different, formal policies are modified in different ways, helping to explain
dramatically different outcomes of similar policies (Chibber, 2003; Khan,
2018; Kohli, 1994). In the case we are looking at, in which digital technolo-
gies are used to improve enforcement, the framework suggests that actual
improvements in enforcement may vary across organizations, dependent on
their relative power and ability to evade or mitigate enhanced burdens of
compliance.
Economic informality, as we define it, refers to any economic activity or-
ganized outside or in conflict with the formal structure of economic laws and
regulations. A wide variety of activities can therefore be described as infor-
mal. Firms or individuals are not ‘formal’ or ‘informal’, only their activities
are, and there may be very few firms in a developing country that comply
fully with all formal rules or with none. Moreover, different types of firms
may violate different rules for different reasons. At the level of an individual
firm, formality is therefore a matter of degree (Tokman, 1992). Formaliza-
tion refers to any process that significantly increases the range of activities
a firm conducts in accordance with formal laws and regulations (Nguyen
et al., 2014). This includes the formal registration of the firm, financing
through formal banking and investment markets, employing workers in ac-
cordance with health, safety and other regulatory requirements, producing
goods that meet certified standards, in certified premises, paying relevant
taxes, with the requisite insurance, and so on. The degree of formality of
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an organization can therefore vary along a spectrum. Formalization can be
based on lowering regulatory requirements so that less capable firms can be-
come compliant, or on increasing sanctions to force firms to comply or close
down (Gandolfo, 2013). When the violating firms are poor and lack power,
the strategy that is more likely to emerge is one that increases sanctions to
force them to squeeze their towels and formalize.
The literature on firms often makes a distinction between ‘formal’ and
‘informal’ sector firms, but we should read this as a judgement about the
degree of formalization of their activities and not as a binary distinction.
In particular, firms in the formal sector do not necessarily follow all formal
rules. Large firms in developing countries often use their power and connec-
tions to violate important rules, informally extracting rents, often with nega-
tive developmental implications. These violations can include distorting the
rules for getting bank loans so that, for instance, collateral is not provided or
uses of funds are misreported, loans are not repaid on time, or at all; captur-
ing subsidies they are not entitled to; fixing prices in public contracts; and so
on. Formal sector firms may also benefit by deliberately keeping aspects of
labour market processes informal (Barrientos, 2008; Meagher, 2019; Nadvi,
2004; Siggel, 2010). However, firms classified as formal are likely to be
registered, pay formal taxes (though the amounts may be informally negoti-
ated), their financial transactions may be with formal banks, and they may
comply with many employment laws. In contrast, many low-productivity
small firms operating close to subsistence levels may also be evading for-
mal rules, but mainly because they lack the capability to comply. As these
firms may not even be able to comply with the basic requirement of registra-
tion, they are typically described as informal sector firms. When detected by
enforcement agencies, they are likely to face stiff penalties (relative to their
ability to pay) or to have to pay large bribes in order to continue to operate.
Given the different reasons and types of informality across firms, enforcing
greater formalization on a selective segment of violations need not necessar-
ily lead to higher productivity or greater welfare (Meagher, 2018; Pimhidzai
and Fox, 2013).
In this article, we assess the implications of using digital technologies to
manage taxes as a way of accelerating formalization along one dimension
of activities, namely tax payments. This is likely to have different effects on
different types of tax violations, and the overall effects are likely to depend
on the distribution of power and capabilities across firms. We look at the
implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India as a lens for
assessing the broader issue of digitization as a tool for accelerating formal-
ization. To simplify our analysis, we make a distinction between two organ-
izational types. The first are low-productivity MSMEs (micro, small and
medium enterprises) in the informal sector that lack the capability to invest
in or use technology that can raise their productivity (Bhattacharya, 2019).
Most of these firms are likely to be micro and small firms. The second are
higher-capability and usually much larger firms. They may be deliberately
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violating rules with the support of their networks of power. Digitization is
likely to have different effects on the two types of firms. For the first, the use
of digital technologies to force higher levels of compliance may push them
beyond their capabilities to pay, while not delivering better public goods or
other targeted benefits quickly enough. The second type of firm may benefit
from the markets vacated by their informal sector competitors and they may
also benefit more from better public goods financed by higher tax revenues.
The top end of firms may also benefit from significant investment oppor-
tunities in the ‘new economy’. Digital data, including digital tax records,
can create opportunities for first movers who can commercialize these data.
Market power based on network economies is difficult enough to regulate
in advanced countries where the disruption has happened largely within ex-
isting rules, rather than by violating rules. In developing countries the op-
portunities for exploiting digital data raise additional challenges because the
powerful are also able to informally violate or change rules in ways that are
less visible, and therefore even more difficult to regulate or mitigate (Ra-
manathan, 2016).
Digital technologies can therefore exacerbate pre-existing asymmetries
of power. While already capable firms may benefit, less capable firms in
the ‘informal sector’ may face much stricter enforcement of their violations
and higher compliance costs, higher informal costs of evasion, or forced
exit from many areas of activity (Bellagio Centre, 2017). Instead of greater
inclusion, the result may be greater inequality, higher entry barriers into
markets and greater difficulties in improving their technological capabilities.
We describe this potentially adverse outcome as ‘premature formalization’.
The informal sector, defined as unregistered firms, accounts for 50–80 per
cent of GDP and 70–90 per cent of employment in Asia and Africa (Ben-
jamin and Mbaye, 2012; Schneider et al., 2010). It includes large numbers of
MSMEs, especially micro and small enterprises. These firms rarely generate
the income required to invest in compliance mechanisms such as software
or even manual systems of record keeping (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2013;
Joshi et al., 2014). Even in OECD countries with high average productivi-
ties, compliance costs for SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) are
much higher as a proportion of their costs relative to larger firms (OECD,
2009: 29). A 2013 study estimated that only 5 per cent of SMEs in India had
a presence on the internet (Gurumurthy and Chami, 2018: 56). Some low-
wage SMEs, like Bangladeshi or Vietnamese garments factories, participate
in global value chains even if they get a bad deal (Nadvi, 2004). But the vast
majority of MSMEs have significantly lower productivity than the typical
garments factory. This heterogeneity is important to keep in mind: there are
big differences in capabilities within the MSME sector, with a very long
tail. The low-capability MSMEs have very limited political voice especially
when it comes to influencing policy or accessing finance, even though they
are the most numerous types of firm (Forkuoh et al., 2015).
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Firm productivity grows slowly. It is not just dependent on investments
in machines and technology but also requires protracted periods of learning
organizational capabilities to use technology at high productivity (Amsden,
1989; Khan, 2019). This is why making some digital technologies avail-
able usually has a much slower effect on the productivity of low-capability
firms but allows much more rapid improvements in the enforcement of some
formal rules including tax payments (Bhattacharya, 2019; Khan and Roy,
2019). Premature formalization can therefore also be described as a process
in which formal compliance costs increase faster than gains in productiv-
ity. For firms that are already at the margins of survival, this can result in
unnecessary hardship or market exit. There is growing evidence that rapid
formalization can have these effects for MSMEs, and we argue that these ef-
fects are not accidental (Demenet et al., 2016; Dibben et al., 2015; La Porta
and Shleifer, 2014).
In the following section we discuss the different types of informality en-
gaged in by informal and formal sector firms in developing countries and
the implications for digitizing taxation. We then examine the co-evolution
of taxation, productivity and representation in advanced countries that led
to the emergence of the ‘fiscal state’. In contrast, in the clientelist pol-
itics commonly observed in developing countries, paying a little more tax
is unlikely to have a significant effect on the political voice of small busi-
nesses or strategies of capability development. Rapid improvements in tax
enforcement using digital technologies may therefore result in adverse con-
sequences that we describe as premature formalization. We review the evi-
dence on the impact of digitizing taxation from India’s GST and other devel-
oping countries. We then review the available evidence on how digital data
are helping to create network economies for politically connected compa-
nies that may further disadvantage MSMEs significantly. In the final section
we outline some of the implications of our analysis and put forward an al-
ternative pathway to greater formalization that is both developmental and
inclusive.
THE INFORMALITY OF ‘INFORMAL’ AND ‘FORMAL’ SECTOR FIRMS
Firms that are violating rules are not always free riding to gain an unfair
advantage. In developing countries, low-capability firms violate many rules
because they are unable to comply. Nevertheless, it has been argued that,
even in these cases, forcing compliance is a good thing and would improve
efficiency (Farrell, 2004). The argument is that enforcement will either in-
duce productivity improvements in firms or, if they go out of business, the
labour and resources freed will be absorbed by more productive firms else-
where. Of course, if neither happens, there may be huge welfare costs if a
large number of lower-capability firms in the informal sector are forced to
close down.
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Enforcement is likely to be welfare enhancing if most firms are capable of
following rules and only a few opportunists are violating. A general adher-
ence to rules (a rule of law) is likely to emerge under these circumstances
and is supported by enforcement. As firms become technically sophisticated,
they need formal rules and contracts because complex transactions cannot
be based solely on informal understandings, personalized relationships or
trust. When most firms have high capabilities and require formal contract-
ing, even powerful firms are likely to be sanctioned when they violate. Firms
are likely to stop transacting with a violating firm and support enforcement
because any signal that they tolerate violations will affect their own credibil-
ity as parties to contracts (Khan, 2010; North et al., 2007, 2013). Politicians
too become rule followers, because they are constrained by a broad distri-
bution of powerful taxpayers.
In contrast, if there are only a few powerful organizations and if their ca-
pabilities are low, the enforcement of laws is not likely to be essential for
their survival. Informal enforcement may work well enough, and also al-
low the capture of rents. Politicians too can violate rules in these contexts
and stay in power by delivering benefits to powerful networks and clients
(Khan, 2018). Politicians are always more responsive to firms that can pay
more tax or mobilize greater instrumental power (Fairfield, 2015). In con-
texts where the powerful do not demand the enforcement of rules, powerful
firms not only have the power to influence policy, they can also violate rules.
Their violations do not lead to action by peers directly or through enforce-
ment agencies because transacting with rule-violating organizations does
not inflict significant reputational costs in these contexts. Improvements in
enforcement technologies are therefore likely to result in more complex out-
comes: weaker violators may face stricter enforcement, but politically con-
nected violators may find new ways of evading enforcement.
The emergence of widespread rule-following behaviour therefore requires
as a necessary condition the emergence of a broad base of high-capability
firms that will support and demand the impartial enforcement of rules. But
improvements in capabilities and productivity across firms is a slow process
requiring intense learning efforts. Low-productivity firms typically become
more capable by gradually acquiring organizational and technical capabil-
ities, rather than by having rules forced upon them (Amsden, 1989; Khan,
2013; Wade, 1988).
Policies supporting learning and capability development have to be driven
by political leaderships with the time horizon and implementation cap-
abilities to be able to benefit from a longer-term economic transformation.
They are rarely driven by pressure from low-capability firms themselves,
who usually have limited power and influence. Even if the latter became
legitimate taxpayers, paying small amounts of tax, this is unlikely to signifi-
cantly improve their political influence (Roy, 2017). Meagher’s (2011) work
in Nigeria shows that even dynamic SMEs usually lack the agency to drive
transformative collective action. For low-capability firms, paying more taxes
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Figure 1. ‘Rule of Law’ Contexts: Inclusionary Digitization
Source: the authors
Figure 2. ‘Rule by Law’ Contexts: Potentially Exclusionary Digitization
Source: the authors
is therefore likely to mainly raise their costs, with limited improvements in
influence (Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012; Mallett et al., 2018; Vij et al., 2017).
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the implications of using digitization to
improve tax compliance in these two ideal-typical configurations. Figure 1
describes a society that already has a rule of law. Here firm capabilities are
high, and violations are occasional and opportunistic. SMEs that violate
rules hurt those that are compliant. Digitizing compliance to improve
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enforcement can reduce this damage and prevent productive companies
going out of business through unfair competition from free riders. Improved
tax collection also improves the delivery of public goods that helps raise
the productivity of all firms. Finally, most firms are already productive and
powerful enough to exercise political voice in a rule-following political
system. This helps them determine the public goods provided in exchange
for the taxes they pay.
In contrast, Figure 2 shows a different set of outcomes in a society where
the rule of law is weak. These countries have political settlements (distribu-
tions of power and capabilities) that only allow a rule by law: rules are en-
forced, but are more likely to be enforced when the violator is weaker than
the violated (Khan, 2018). Here, improved enforcement capabilities may
lead to higher compliance costs and taxes for lower-productivity enterprises,
without commensurate improvements in public services that can help raise
their productivity. Moreover, more powerful organizations (both economic
and political) may continue to use informal power to evade regulations. They
may also benefit from the exit of some of their low-capability competitors.
At the top end of powerful companies, access to data can create lucrative
opportunities, including collusive ones, in contexts of weak regulation. The
policy support for digitization assumes the first type of political settlement
as in advanced countries. Developing country political settlements are likely
to be closer to the second, where digitization can easily lead to exclusionary
outcomes (Jacobs, 2017: 52).
THE ‘FISCAL STATE’ VERSUS THE CLIENTELIST STATE
The political settlement framework provides an analysis of these different
types of relationship between state and society and the role of taxation in
that relationship. The role of taxation in cementing the relationship between
state and society in advanced countries has been the subject of a large litera-
ture on institutions and governance (Besley and Persson, 2014; Bird, 1992;
Brautigam, 2008; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Levi, 1989; Mann, 1993;
Moore, 2008; Ross, 2004; Schumpeter, 1991). This work ranges from ap-
plications of rational choice theory to heterodox political economy, but a
common theme is the evolution of state–society relations through bargain-
ing over taxation. The emergence of institutions to protect property rights,
establish checks and balances on the executive, or provide political stabil-
ity has been traced to different aspects of the tax bargain (North, 1990: 49;
Olson, 2000).
Historical work on the emergence of the ‘fiscal state’ in advanced West-
ern countries has also outlined the pivotal importance of taxation. Brewer
(1989) shows how state capacity developed in late 17th-century England
through improvements in the tax-collecting capacity of the British Excise
Office. Daunton (2001) describes the transformation of Britain from a
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domain state (where the ruling classes raised taxes from their own estates),
to a tax state (where the state financed itself through general taxation)
and finally to a fiscal state (where the level and uses of taxation were
determined in representative bodies). A number of authors have traced a
similar co-evolution of representation and taxation in the United States
and France (Bailyn et al., 1977; Morgan and Morgan, 1953; Ross, 2004).
The modern state became a ‘tax state’, where taxation and representation
were closely related (Schumpeter, 1991: 112). The relationship between
representation and taxation usually evolved very differently in developing
countries, mediated by different types of colonialism. While there were a
range of experiences, colonial rule in non-settler colonies almost always
engaged in extensive social engineering. Some forms of representation
gradually emerged, but the primary objective was not to raise taxes with
consent, but to manage and control societies from above. To do this, colonial
powers often created what looked like modern representative institutions,
but they functioned very differently (Di John, 2006; Khan, 2002, 2005,
2012). Colonial rulers did not need to engage in negotiations with taxpayers
to raise revenue. They could rely on their military superiority to persuade
people to pay taxes. The function of representation was instead to selectively
incorporate leaders and organizations with organizational power (rather
than tax-paying ability) to reduce the costs of maintaining control. This
involved organizing and selectively incorporating groups based on tribes,
religions, ethnicities, regions or other markers, to divide societies and make
rule easier. The politics of clientelism emerged out of these processes as
identity-based groups or populist parties were incentivized to mobilize in
conflicts over the distribution of rents. Politics was usually not driven by
productive interests paying taxes in order to negotiate their rates and uses.
The distribution of patronage was more important than the delivery of
public goods for maintaining support for colonial rule. The development
of productive enterprises was also a lower political priority for most colo-
nial powers, and this too resulted in a weaker link between taxation, pro-
ductive interests and demands for representation. Anti-colonial movements
eventually emerged, with leaders from the intermediate classes, but this led
to colonial rulers being replaced with local ones playing very similar pa-
tronage games. Productive groups continued to play a subordinate role in
most cases. These differences in the broad historical background help to ex-
plain why productive taxpayers were and remain much less powerful in these
political settlements relative to those in advanced countries and relative to
redistributive clientelist networks in their own countries which still domi-
nate in the politics of rent distribution. The relevant point for us is that the
feedback loop between taxation and political accountability has historically
been weaker in most developing countries (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, 2008;
Meagher, 2018).
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INDIA’S GST, DIGITAL ENFORCEMENT AND MSMES
In the political settlements of developing countries where the rule of law is
weak, the enforcement of laws is likely to be selective. The relative power
of the parties involved is likely to influence what is well-enforced and on
whom, and what is not. We explore the implications of technology that may
allow improvements in the enforcement of particular taxes, using the ex-
ample of the Goods and Service Tax (GST) introduced in India in 2017.
The GST is like a value-added tax and has a number of objectives. One is
to eliminate price distortions by unifying tax rates for various categories
of products across the country: previously, each Indian state could impose
its own taxes, making it difficult for a product produced in one state to be
sold in another at competitive prices. Another objective is to increase tax
compliance as its digital management enables end-to-end digital checking
of invoices and transactions (Srivastava and Chaudhary, 2017). Finally, the
GST is also presented as a tool for formalizing the economy by bringing in-
formal sector enterprises into the tax net by lowering exemption thresholds
(Ghosh, 2020).
The digital compliance happens through the Goods and Services Tax Net-
work (GSTN), a platform that manages all the transactions and data related
to the GST. It provides every registered firm with a digital identity that is vis-
ible to the authorities but also to others charged with operating the platform.
Businesses that have an annual turnover of roughly US$ 50,000 or more (4
million rupees), or that trade across states, have to register and file returns
online. The compliance costs for GST are significant as three returns have to
be submitted each month. Although the minimum turnover for registration
appears to be high, many MSMEs fall within this bracket, and moreover,
many others who are below the limit feel compelled to register in order to
trade with other registered firms. Within 18 months of its introduction, the
number of firms registered for GST was double the number registered in the
pre-GST sales tax regimes (Ghosh, 2020: 33).
While big businesses were largely welcoming of the policy, smaller
ones, particularly in the informal sector, immediately began to register se-
rious difficulties (Chowdhury, 2019; Mukherjea, 2019; Rajagopalan, 2018;
Rajshekhar, 2017; Yadav, 2018). Estimates of the size of the MSME sector
in India put it at close to 63 million units with micro enterprises accounting
for 99.4 per cent of this universe (Soni, 2020). Micro enterprises are defined
as those with an annual turnover of up to US$ 662,715 at 2020 exchange
rates (Rastogi, 2020). These micro enterprises make up the vast majority
of firms in India (Rajshekhar, 2017; Vij et al., 2017). Over 95 per cent of
MSMEs are unregistered or informal (Vij et al., 2017).
The immediate concerns voiced by MSMEs regarding the GST were the
cost of compliance, which affected their viability, and harassment by tax au-
thorities. Larger firms already have well-functioning and automated finance
departments and high levels of interstate transactions that can benefit from
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the simplification brought about by uniform tax slabs. This is not the case
for MSMEs who had to introduce new systems and competencies and had
little to gain from the simplification of cross-state activities (Tyagi et al.,
2019). Research on the effects of an enhanced enforcement of tax systems
in other developing countries also points to the heterogeneous effects across
firm types (Joshi et al., 2014). An analysis of the Indian experience is im-
portant because platforms like the GSTN, and even dedicated platforms for
micro enterprises, are being considered in Nigeria (GSMA, 2019) and other
countries. The dominant narrative about the economic and political benefits
of enforcing formal tax rules has suppressed the growing evidence that the
formalization of MSME taxation may be premature and may widen their
social gap with firms of higher capabilities (Mallett et al., 2018; McCulloch
et al., 2010; McKenzie and Sakho, 2010).
Like a value-added tax, GST requires firms to keep invoices and records
to recover tax rebates on input purchases. The digital management system,
the GSTN, allows the tax authority to match invoices through the transac-
tion chain to control fraud and evasion. The digital compliance requirement
affects large and small firms in very different ways. Most informal sector
firms transact with many others in small transactions and repeated trans-
actions are less common. That means new details of trading partners have
to be entered each time. In contrast, formal sector firms are more likely
to have repeated transactions. The costs of keeping records per transaction
are therefore higher for smaller informal firms, and their transaction sizes
are smaller. This makes the compliance cost per transaction in MSMEs an
even higher share of their smaller transaction values. While larger firms also
report higher compliance costs, for them the cost increase is rarely existen-
tial (Rajshekhar, 2017). The minutes of the 32nd meeting of India’s GST
Council (the constitutional oversight body) recorded that businesses with
a turnover of around US$ 80,000 annually, who were paying annual GST
of only around US$ 67,1 would nevertheless have to spend US$ 200–270
on filing their returns (Ghosh, 2020). For MSMEs operating in low-value
activities, disproportionate compliance costs are not unusual or restricted
to India. Studies in Africa highlight similar effects (Benjamin and Mbaye,
2012; Forkuoh et al., 2015).
Introducing a tax like the GST in a poor economy requires many ex-
emptions and allowances. Paradoxically, this also made GST a complex tax
and many firms ended up paying too much because the exemptions were
not always understood. For instance, small firms limited to intra-state trad-
ing could opt to be in a ‘composition scheme’ and pay 1 per cent of their
turnover as tax, but they are not allowed to collect GST from customers
or claim refunds. Similarly, some manufacturers face higher rates of GST
on their inputs than their outputs, resulting in a tax overhang that blocks
1. This can happen because there are five rates: 0 per cent, 5 per cent, 12 per cent, 18 per cent
and 28 per cent.
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capital before rebates are recovered. Thus, many problems were created by
variations in rates and exemptions, which themselves reflect the problem of
forcing a heterogeneous and low-productivity base of firms into a digitally
administered system with invoice cross-checking. Here we only focus on the
most general issues affecting compliance costs.
In her survey of 157 MSMEs, Ghosh (2020) looked at the effects of
GST on steel almirah (cupboard) manufacturers in Mumbai, hosiery mak-
ers in Delhi and power-loom operators in Surat. Informal firms accounted
for a large proportion of firms in these sectors. While 30 per cent of SMEs
(mostly mid-sized firms) already had accountants, smaller firms registered
on the GSTN had to hire in accounting services costing them between US$
160 and US$ 400 annually. In almirah manufacturing, many small firms
below the threshold revenue level felt compelled to register on the GSTN
because their buyers were registered dealers. Though there are exemptions
allowing registered dealers to buy from unregistered firms, these are dif-
ficult to administer, and most registered dealers choose not to. Moreover,
registered small firms selling to smaller unregistered dealers are forced to
cut prices to remain competitive as they cannot pass on GST to these deal-
ers. The winners from this confusion have been branded producers and large
registered dealers as they have a simple invoice chain to manage and can ab-
sorb the compliance costs. It was widely reported in the Indian media that
large formal sector firms rapidly increased their market share after GST was
introduced (Srinivasan and Shankar, 2018).
If average productivity in activities like almirah manufacturing is rising,
it is because MSMEs are closing down, leaving the space to larger regis-
tered firms, not because they are squeezing their dry towels to innovate and
become more productive (Ghosh, 2020; Rajshekhar, 2017; Yadav, 2018).
Evidence from other countries such as Sri Lanka suggests that a much bet-
ter strategy would have been to let MSMEs formalize activities as and when
their benefits from doing so exceeded their costs (De Mel et al., 2013). Many
of the purported benefits of formalization do not materialize in practice and
firms on the ground are the best judge of whether the theoretical benefits are
real. For instance, studies by De Mel et al. (2013) in Sri Lanka and McKen-
zie and Sakho (2010) in Bolivia show that access to credit does not increase
with formalization for most SMEs. A majority of SMEs lack collateral that
banks consider acceptable, and their narrow profit margins and low turnover
make them high-risk businesses (Vij et al., 2017). Unless supported by spe-
cial schemes, the fact that they have become registered taxpayers on digital
systems (or have made progress on other dimensions of formalization) is
unlikely to change these fundamental constraints.
Given that the likely effects of GST on MSMEs in India were significant,
adverse and predictable, it is interesting to ask why India moved ahead
with a GST with digital enforcement on this scale. It partly reflects the low
bargaining power of the huge number of MSMEs relative to the far less
numerous corporate interests that stood to gain from GST and therefore
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supported the reform. In neighbouring Bangladesh, moves in the early
2000s to introduce a VAT system with rebates, pushed by the International
Monetary Fund and development partners, were blocked and watered down
by a coalition of MSME interests. Here MSMEs were supported by formal
sector firms, because they too had low productivity levels and were threat-
ened by the compliance costs of the VAT system (Hassan and Prichard,
2016). India’s problem may well have been a much wider gap between its
small but powerful corporate sector and the much larger lower-productivity
economy lacking political voice that was left further behind by policies like
the GST. This could be a cautionary tale for other countries contemplating
selective formalization.
REALLY BIG PLAYERS: QUASI-PRIVATE ‘NATIONAL INFORMATION
UTILITIES’
At the very top of the corporate pyramid in India, there is a new and rapidly
evolving organizational structure emerging to harvest and exploit data
linked to digital identities. This involves quasi non-governmental organi-
zations with close formal and informal links with bureaucrats and politi-
cians. These organizations, which include the GSTN, the Unique Identifica-
tion Authority of India (UIDAI) which manages Aadhaar,2 and the National
Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), have built and manage national-
level databases and platforms, which give them the ability to access troves
of data. In a context where formal rules are weakly enforced, the regulation
of these and other powerful organizations raises important questions. Many
of these organizations are non-profit organizations with a government stake
while others are private organizations. Meagher and Lindell (2013) highlight
the complex ways in which formal and informal sectors can interact in devel-
oping countries, and point out that outcomes are not necessarily beneficial
for the poor. We take this further by interrogating how large ‘formal’ play-
ers in developing countries interact informally in their own dealings with the
state, thereby further increasing their inequalities with the ‘informal’ sector.
The huge advantage of being a first mover in processing big data is a phe-
nomenon affecting both advanced and developing countries. However, in
developing countries, the quasi-private first movers are, in addition, closely
2. Aadhaar is an identification number used by successive Indian governments as proof of
identity and residence, and which is linked to citizens’ biometric data. Launched in 2009,
the aim is to improve welfare outcomes and inclusion by formalizing the identity of citizens.
Its enforcement has been controversial as India’s higher courts have ruled it voluntary and
not a mandatory requirement. Yet the current Indian government has linked many critical
welfare services to the possession of an Aadhaar number. As a result, it is also able to
use Aadhaar to exclude minorities and the poor (Khan and Roy, 2019). Privacy concerns
remain high as there is little transparency around how data are managed, and the initial aim
of inclusion has been inconsistently met.
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associated with public data systems and enjoy informal relationships with
governments. The challenges of regulating digital strategies are therefore
significantly greater compared to advanced countries where a stronger rule
of law can be more effective in enforcing laws restricting collusive rela-
tionships between companies, bureaucrats and politicians. The problem in
advanced countries is that laws have been slow to adapt to new technologies
and market challenges, and the adaptation has been slowed by powerful in-
terests. The issue has not in general been that powerful data organizations
in advanced countries have flouted laws. Indeed, there have been effective
anti-trust actions against big tech firms on both sides of the Atlantic, includ-
ing rulings on taxation (Apple in Ireland) and legislative scrutiny of Face-
book and Google. But governments are still not sure about the best regula-
tory structures given the new challenges thrown up by network economies,
where breaking up companies with market power can actually raise prices
for consumers.
Collusive relationships and emerging market power in developing coun-
tries often arise for different reasons. In some countries, governments want
to exercise greater control over the economy and polity. In countries like
India, with relatively developed technology sectors, the motive is also to de-
velop domestic data-based companies. Access to data at scale, it is argued,
can help create an Indian equivalent of an American FAANG (Facebook,
Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google) or of a Baidu in China. This is not ne-
cessarily a disinterested industrial policy goal, as the development of such
companies can serve to further increase the power of particular business–
government coalitions.
This informal industrial policy is very different from the formal support
for technology companies in advanced countries where research and innova-
tion are often funded and regulated by the state. Examples such as Darpanet
or the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in the USA that indirectly supported the
commercialization of knowledge by private companies have been widely
discussed (Mazzucato, 2013). The concern with the digital economy in ad-
vanced countries is how to control the market power of first movers who
benefit from large network economies or to appropriately regulate them
when they have access to sensitive data (Singh, 2020; UNCTAD, 2019). The
additional problem in developing countries is that a significant portion of the
public data ecosystem is coming under the control of quasi-private organi-
zations that manage public databases with the government as a stakeholder
(Khan and Roy, 2019; Lakshmanan, 2020). Here, the issue is not just that
the laws have not fully adapted to the new challenges, but, in addition, the
government is unlikely to be able to enforce laws on these quasi-private data
organizations when political interests within governments are stakeholders.
This is a new dimension of the informality that powerful organizations al-
ready exercise in violating or distorting rules in developing countries. Thus,
the problem in developing countries is not just that the laws have not fully
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adapted to new data-use challenges, but also that any laws are likely to be
enforced in partisan ways.
The GSTN is an excellent example of a platform that generates huge
quantities of granular data down to recording discrete trades of businesses
classified according to the Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN)
codes from invoices recorded on the platform. It also collects data on move-
ments of goods using the electronic waybills (ewaybills) that businesses
have to submit whenever goods transported are worth over US$ 665. In
2016, Nandan Nilekani, one of India’s foremost technology entrepreneurs
and the founder-chairman of the country’s UIDAI that collects and manages
data for the Aadhaar identity system, laid out his expectation that digitizing
identity and linking it to a variety of transactions including taxation would
bring millions of consumers and small businesses in the informal sector
into the formal economy (Ramanathan, 2016). The huge benefit, he thought,
would be that these individuals would then get access to reliable and cheap
credit, because financial institutions would forego high transaction fees to
get access to the rich digital information generated by their customers.
Nilekani was wrong. It is not just that this is taking time to come about.
Unlike normal commodities, the generator of data has no enforceable prop-
erty rights over the data even in advanced countries. Were notional rights
over data recognized, it would require a degree of impartial regulatory con-
trol that is not easy to imagine in the typical developing country. The gen-
eration of data so far (in both advanced and developing countries) has been
more like a transfer where one side does not get paid but may get access to
services of a type and at a price determined by the other side. But in develop-
ing countries MSMEs are particularly weak in bargaining over the benefits
they get from ‘granting’ others the use of their data, and the quasi-private
companies are much less constrained in the exercise of their market power.
MSMEs are already compelled to register for GST, and Lakshmanan
(2020) describes the data that can be accessed by platforms like the GSTN
as another form of tax collection. But as with the taxation of MSMEs, the
mining of their data, linking it to data from other government agencies, or
sharing it with private entities to create new products, is unlikely to benefit
the MSMEs which will, in all probability, remain commercially uninterest-
ing. On the contrary, the use of these data by financial or other companies
to focus on lucrative segments of the market lowers the risks for the former,
but more effectively excludes the vulnerable. In countries like Kenya, link-
ing digital identities to credit histories has helped reduce non-performing
loans for banks, but at the expense of MSMEs which have higher risks but
are potentially productive (Gelb and Diofasi, 2016). Some of these data may
occasionally be used to improve the targeting of welfare spending, but the
main impetus of using the data will be the search for even greater profits by
big first-mover companies that can access and use the data (Lakshmanan,
2020). In India there are already plans to use GST data to launch an appli-
cation for banks and financial companies to access data on SME receivables
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as well as invoice details. These data will then be used to develop an un-
derwriting model to provide creditworthy businesses with credit but also to
exclude higher-risk firms, likely to be smaller and more vulnerable ones, as
assessed by their data.
CONCLUSION
Digital technologies and incremental processes of formalization do not ne-
cessarily result in exclusion any more than they necessarily ensure inclusion.
Both outcomes are possible. We only question the expectation that the for-
malization of a growing range of activities using digital tools is necessarily a
way of ensuring accelerated inclusion, greater political voice for the vulner-
able and a faster pace of development. Some of these expectations may be
plausible in a world which already has a favourable configuration of organi-
zational power and production capabilities. These configurations would also
support a rule of law and ‘modern’ representative relationships between tax-
payers and states. Developed countries, in which many of these conditions
have held for some time, also face concerns of accelerated concentration in
the new digital economy.
However, developing countries have yet to go through the phase of pro-
ductive, broad-based capitalism that helped push up income levels in ad-
vanced countries. In the political settlements of the typical developing coun-
try, large-scale enforced formalization at low per capita incomes, even along
very specific dimensions of activity, can result in enhanced exclusion. We
describe this as premature formalization and our reference to the Indian ex-
perience with its GST shows that this is not just a theoretical possibility. In
such instances, formalization could lead to many small firms being unable
to survive due to costs of compliance. They may be further disadvantaged by
the data generated by their activities identifying their businesses as higher
risk and being excluded from the digital economy driven by large first-mover
digital firms.
What then may be a less problematic path towards inclusion, towards ris-
ing living standards and greater political voice for the many who are ex-
cluded? The political settlements framework suggests part of the answer.
The low productivity and low levels of organizational capabilities of the
excluded lie at the heart of the configuration of power that excludes them.
We believe this constraint needs to be directly targeted by policy. Countries
that have emerged from poverty and backwardness have done so because
their economic policies and institutions succeeded in raising productive and
organizational capabilities across broad swathes of their societies. We sug-
gest taking seriously a direction of causality that is the reverse of the one
that underpins a lot of our current understanding of formality and informal-
ity. Instead of expecting that policy supporting incremental formalization
will lead us towards greater productivity and inclusion, we suggest a much
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greater need to focus on how to directly raise productivity across a broad
spectrum of firms and activities as a way of achieving sustainable formal-
ization and inclusion. At the very least, both directions of causality need to
be looked at very carefully.
Policies to improve skills and to support the transfer of technologies and
the transfer and learning of organizational capabilities that raise productivity
do not necessarily require the recipients of this support to immediately fol-
low rules of registration, tax compliance and so on, which may be too costly
for them at their existing levels of productivity. If absolutely essential, easier
and cheaper ways of recording citizens and activities to enable programme
support already exist and can be further developed. After all, catching up
and learning strategies were implemented by countries including South Ko-
rea, Taiwan and China before their societies were fully formalized. Indeed,
their success in raising productivity and capabilities allowed them to accel-
erate their formalization. Digital technologies and systems can greatly help
in these processes, but only if we understand both directions of causality and
identify the more important direction of causality for policy attention.
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